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Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism in South
Asia: India–Pakistan Nuclear Detection
Architecture
Muhammad Umer Khan
Middlebury Institute of International Studies (MIIS)

Abstract
Terrorism has bedeviled India and Pakistan for more than three decades now. Both countries accuse each
other of stoking sectarian, religious and separatist sentiments, which in turn lead to terrorist acts. India has
accused Pakistan of supporting insurgents in Kashmir, Indian Punjab, and northeastern states with
training and weapons [1]. Pakistan also castigates India for aiding and abetting Baloch militants [2]. Post
9/11, terrorists adopted the technique of spectacular attacks. The 2008 Mumbai attacks and the Peshawar
school attack in December 2014 have affirmed credence in the fear that the terrorists will resort to any
possible method to kill innocent citizens of both countries.
The geopolitical rivals have had a tortuous relationship since their respective independences, but neither
of them will tolerate an incident of nuclear and radiological terrorism in South Asia. This paper will
discuss the probability of nuclear and radiological terrorism in South Asia, the opportunities for
collaboration between India and Pakistan to deter and detect such terrorism, and the impact of an India–
Pakistan collaboration.

I.

Probability of Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) classifies nuclear and radiological terrorism in four threat
categories: (1) the possibility of non-state actors acquiring an intact nuclear weapon; (2) the acquisition of
enough fissile material to manufacture a bomb; (3) the acquisition of radiological material to make a
radiological dispersal devise; and (4) a possible attack or sabotage of a nuclear power plant or a waste
storage facility [3].
In order to gauge the likelihood of a nuclear and radiological terrorist attack, it is important to understand
the ideology and motivations of the major terrorist groups in the region.
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A.

Ideologies and Motivations of the Major Terrorist Groups
in South Asia

According to Ashley Tellis, the following types of terrorist groups operate in Pakistan: sectarian groups,
Anti–India groups, Al Qaeda and its affiliates, and the Pakistani Taliban [4]. Among these groups, Indiaspecific terrorist groups, Al Qaeda, and the Pakistani Taliban are likely to employ nuclear and
radiological materials to inflict human and financial loss both in India and Pakistan [5]. Osama bin Laden
declared that using weapons of mass destruction is an integral part of jihad. This statement can provide
inspiration to groups who share Al Qaeda’s ideology to use nuclear and radiological materials in terrorist
acts.
Both Al Qaeda, and the Pakistani Taliban have carried out multiple terrorist attacks across Pakistan. Most
notably among those attacks was on the army headquarters in December 2010, with the objective of
holding senior military officers as hostages [6]. Recently, the Pakistani Taliban attacked an armymanaged high school and killed more than 140 students at point blank ranges [7]. This attack displayed
that the Pakistani Taliban can resort to any tactic in their war against the Pakistani state. Such motivation
has even led the Taliban to formulate plans to attack nuclear facilities [8]. In September 2012, Pakistani
intelligence agencies intercepted a telephone conversation between Taliban members who were planning
to strike a nuclear facility in Dera Ghazi Khan, Pakistan; the facility comprises uranium milling and
mining operations, and a uranium hexafluoride conversion plant.
After the Afghan war, Pakistan created the anti-Indian jihadi network to initiate an insurgency in the
Indian-held Kashmir. Gradually these groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, started
attacking major Indian cities. Lashkar-e-Taiba was involved in the attack on the Indian Parliament in
2001 and also carried out the Fedayeen-style attack in Mumbai in 2008 [9]. Most of these jihadi groups
are motivated by the Deobandi sect, which disregards the Westphalia concept of nation states and believes
in Ummah (pan-Islamism). According to Hussain Haqqani, former Pakistan Ambassador to the United
States, Jaish-e-Muhammad shares the ideology of Al Qaeda, which means that only Muslims should rule
Muslim land.

B.

Emerging Nexus Between Different Terrorist Groups

Although these groups originated to serve differing purposes, a strong nexus is emerging between them.
According to Don Rassler, in addition to providing expertise, Al Qaeda is playing the role of mediator
and coordinator among these militant groups [10]. He further quotes Bruce Riedel that the Pakistani
Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the anti-Indian militants are collaborating on terrorist attacks [10]. Sectarian
groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, which target Shias, have also forged an alliance with the Taliban [11]. In
2012, the leadership of the sectarian militant groups and the Pakistani Taliban operated with impunity
from North Waziristan, one of the seven lawless, tribal agencies of Pakistan [12]. Sajjan Gohel, Director
for International Security for the Asia-Pacific Foundation, believes that Al Qaeda operatives were based
in major cities of Pakistan and not restricted to tribal areas: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was caught in
Rawalpindi, Abu Zubaydah in Faisalabad, and Tawfiq bin Attash and Ramzi Binalshibh in Karachi [13].
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was apprehended from the house of an activist of Jamaat-e-Islami, a major
political party in Pakistan [14]. Nigel Inkster, Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risk for the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), believes that Al Qaeda has created alliances through
intermarriages and business partnerships.
Al Qaeda and Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) are competing for supremacy in South Asia. In
order to outshine ISIS, Al Qaeda created its South Asian wing [15]. ISIS, which controls territory in Iraq
and Syria, has found support among militant factions in South Asia [16]. The newly created South Asian
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wing of Al Qaeda launched an audacious attack on a dockyard in September 2014 to hijack a naval frigate
which would have been used to attack United States and Indian naval ships in the Arabian Sea [15]. This
reflects that Al Qaeda is trying new methods of attacking western targets and it has now included India on
the list of its targets.
The South Asian wing of Al Qaeda, in collaboration with Pakistani Taliban and its other affiliates, could
try to procure and employ nuclear and radiological sources in terrorist attacks. After Operation Zarb-eAzb was launched by the Pakistan Army to clear its tribal areas of the terrorist group, the risk of a
spectacular attack larger than the Mumbai attack should not be ruled out. The International Atomic
Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) contains 2,477 incidents of nuclear
and radiological material out of regulatory control from January 1993 to December 2013 [17]. According
to IAEA:
Of the 2477 confirmed incidents, 424 involved unauthorized possession and related
criminal activities. Incidents included in this category involved illegal possession,
movement or attempts to illegally trade in or use nuclear material or radioactive sources.
Sixteen incidents in this category involved high-enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium.
There were 664 incidents reported that involved the theft or loss of nuclear or other
radioactive material and a total of 1337 cases involving other unauthorized activities,
including the unauthorized disposal of radioactive materials or discovery of uncontrolled
sources [18].
By pilfering nuclear and radiological materials, terrorists can fabricate Improvised Nuclear Devices
(INDs) and Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs). In the past, for instance, the Japanese cult Aum
Shinrikyo has tried to obtain nuclear material to carry out nuclear terrorism [19]. Experts have repeatedly
said that nuclear terrorism is a possibility if terrorists acquire nuclear materials. According to Matthew
Bunn, nuclear terrorism is a very genuine threat and “making a nuclear bomb is really about slamming
two pieces [of highly enriched uranium] together at high speed” [20].

II.

Collaboration Between India and Pakistan to Tackle
Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism
A.

Historical Precedence of Nuclear and Counterterrorism
Cooperation

There is a history of nuclear cooperation between the two nuclear-armed nations. In 1988, India and
Pakistan signed an agreement, which stated “each party shall refrain from undertaking, encouraging or
participating in, directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing the destruction of, or damage to, any
nuclear installation or facility in the other country” [21].
In 1999, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee travelled to Lahore for discussions on various issues. At the
end of the summit, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed, which stated:
The two sides are fully committed to undertaking national measures to reducing the risks
of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under their respective control. The
two sides further undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of any accidental,
unauthorized or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse
consequences for both sides, or an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two countries, as
well as to adopt measures aimed at diminishing the possibility of such actions, or such
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incidents being misinterpreted by the other. The two sides shall identify/establish the
appropriate communication mechanism for this purpose [22].
The two agreements are not only unparalleled in South Asia, but also provide basis for optimism that
consensus can be reached to tackle the issue of nuclear and radiological terrorism. There has been
precedence where India and Pakistan have agreed to work on counterterrorism in the region. In 2006,
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Pervez Musharraf met in Havana, Cuba, where both
countries declared that they would set up a Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism to identify and investigate
terrorist incidents [23].
Both nations, utilizing the previous agreements as a general framework, can lay out more precise
arrangements described below.

III. South Asian Nuclear Detection Architecture
A.

Need Analysis

India and Pakistan share a border of 3,323 kilometers. The current trade between the two countries is only
a paltry three billion dollars, but with the normalization of relations, experts expect an exponential growth
of trade to 40 billion dollars [24]. In 2008, India and Pakistan opened a trade route across the disputed
territory of Kashmir [25]. They are also planning to set up 13 border crossings in the coming years [26].
The first integrated border post was set up in 2012, which increased the number of trucks able to be
viewed entering Pakistan from 150 to at least 800. This boost of trade also gives opportunities to nonstate actors to traffic nuclear and radiological material across the border.
In order to prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism, detection of such unaccounted-for materials is of
paramount importance. Creating South Asian Nuclear Detection Architecture can surmount this
challenge. According to Dr. Gowadia, Director of the United States Department of Homeland Security’s
(DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), “a detection event can be in the form of information
or intelligence alerts, technical detection alerts, and traditional law enforcement work” [27].
Cooperation between the intelligence agencies may not be possible because of the deep mistrust between
the two countries, but a joint project of interdicting nuclear and radiological projects can be initiated by
the Customs Department. With the passage of time, law enforcement and intelligence officials can also
become part of the project. The South Asian Nuclear Detection Architecture can comprise the South
Asian Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG), jointly manned radiological
detection border posts, a joint working group of legal officials holding expertise in forensic evidence,
regular interaction between the regulatory bodies, and pre- and post-detonation nuclear forensics training
at either Pakistan’s center of excellence for nuclear security, the Nuclear Security Training Center
(NSTC), or at India’s, the Global Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP).

B.

South Asian Nuclear Forensics International Technical
Working Group

According to IAEA, “nuclear forensics is the analysis of intercepted illicit nuclear or radioactive material
and any associated material to provide evidence for nuclear attribution. The goal of nuclear analysis is to
identify forensic indicators in interdicted nuclear and radiological samples or the surrounding
environment, e.g. the container or transport vehicle” [28].
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A concerted effort is required to have a dedicated group of experts with the requisite capacity to perform
pre- and post-detonation nuclear forensics. India and Pakistan are already participating in the activities of
the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the International Criminal Police
Organization (INTERPOL), and IAEA to augment the nuclear forensics capabilities of these multilateral
bodies [29]. Both countries have endorsed GICNT’s Statement of Principles, which calls to “improve the
ability to detect nuclear and other radioactive materials in order to prevent illicit trafficking, including
cooperation in the research and development of national detection capabilities that would be
interoperable” [30]. They could utilize the guidance of such multilateral forums to establish a South Asian
Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group. As nuclear forensics requires a wide range of
expertise, the nuclear forensics center should ideally accommodate legal experts, scientists, law
enforcement and intelligence experts, and first responders.
The Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) and Bhabha Atomic Research Center’s (BARC)
nominated officials can provide their technical expertise to the law enforcement experts from both sides
in this regional forensics-working group.

C.

Collaboration Between Indian and Pakistani National
Nuclear Forensics Libraries

According to IAEA:
The State should consider establishing nuclear forensics libraries for its inventory of
nuclear and other radioactive material. These libraries should include databases of all
material produced, used, and stored in a State and, if applicable, supported by sample and
literature archives. The State should be capable of responding to queries of other States
regarding recovered nuclear or other radioactive materials that may have been produced,
used, or stored on the State’s territory [31].
According to David Smith, a nuclear forensics library should entail features on key nuclear fuel cycles
and isotope production stages like uranium ores and ore bodies, uranium mining and milling, uranium
conversion, uranium enrichment, uranium fuel fabrication, mixed oxide fuel fabrication, reactor fresh fuel
assemblies, irradiated (spent) fuel, nuclear reprocessing, nuclear waste, and isotope production of both
sealed and unsealed radioactive sources [32].
A joint library between the two nuclear-armed nations would be impossible because of the sensitivities
attached to the subject; however, both nations can request each other, through the point of contact, to
share information if an unaccounted for nuclear or radiological material is detected. If the material does
not match the samples in the national libraries, both nations can contact and share their findings with
IAEA via their point of contact.

1.

Verification of Data

The major problem in creating an international database is that both states have apprehensions about
sharing their sensitive data. According to a report prepared for the United States government, the major
obstacles for creating a database are: commercial desires to protect sensitive data, problems related to
classification and established government policies, states’ refusal to cooperate, and attempts to spoof the
database [33]. There can never be confidence in the South Asian nuclear security architecture if the
national nuclear forensics libraries of India and Pakistan are not verified. Neither country would allow
each other to verify their libraries. However, friendly countries can carry out verification. In the case of
Pakistan, it can be conducted by China, while the United States can verify India’s libraries.
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Pakistan has always been insecure when it comes to sharing details about its nuclear program. After the
United States’ raid in 2011, which killed Osama Bin Laden, the then Pakistani military chief General
Kiyani, feared the United States capability to launch a simultaneous attack to neutralize its nuclear
weapons [34]. Due to its close historic ties with China, Pakistan considers China a reliable ally. The level
of trust can be gauged by a statement of Chairman Ansar Parvez of the Pakistan Atomic Energy
Commission (PAEC), who argued for a nuclear deal with China instead of the United States [35].
China and Pakistan have been opaque regarding their nuclear cooperation agreement signed in 1986.
Their cooperation started a decade before 1986 when Prime Minister Zulifqar Ali Bhutto accepted in
1976 that both countries were collaborating in this field [36]. According to T.V. Paul, the Pakistani bomb
would not have existed without the help of the Chinese. They have even provided direct assistance in the
building of the plutonium reactors at Khushab [37]. This shows that Pakistan trusts China and would not
have issues sharing the data in their nuclear forensics library. China, in turn, could issue a quality
assessment report, without sharing sensitive details, to tell the world that Pakistan has a credible nuclear
forensics library.
Despite not being a member of the Nonproliferation Treaty, the United States signed a nuclear agreement
with India in 2005. Under this deal, India agreed to implement the Additional Protocol, which gives
inspectors intrusive access to its civilian nuclear facilities, works towards negotiating a Fissile Material
Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and continues India’s moratorium on nuclear testing [38]. Besides bringing
India to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the United States and India have formed a joint working
group on counter-terrorism and signed a counter-terrorism initiative in 2010 [39]. For now, this working
group has mostly focused on terrorism, financial and economic fraud, narcotics, trafficking, cybercrime,
and transnational organized crime [40]. The group could enlarge the scope of their cooperation to
deterring nuclear terrorism and detecting nuclear trafficking. Even when India and the United States did
not sign the nuclear deal, efforts were made to establish cooperation between Indian research centers and
Brookhaven National Labs [41]. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is one of the prime
institutions in the United States that is trying to engage other states in nuclear forensics. In addition to
helping India build its national nuclear forensics library, this lab can also verify the quality of the library’s
data.

D.

India–Pakistan Nuclear Detection Check Posts

As mentioned earlier, India and Pakistan are planning to establish 13 integrated check posts for
facilitating trade. It is likely that militants in the region can jeopardize any initiative to bring peace.
Therefore, these check posts must include nuclear detection equipment and trained manpower to detect
illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials.
Let’s consider a hypothetical scenario, where a truck carrying a radiological material is interdicted at the
Wagah–Attari border between India and Pakistan: the jointly manned detection post will inform its
supervisors about the confiscated material. The detection post will contact both the regulatory authorities
in India and Pakistan, which in turn would convene the nuclear forensics-working group. The technical
experts will analyze the interdicted material and conduct a non-destructive analysis. The nuclear forensics
analysis can be carried out at the post, utilizing the mobile radiological lab developed by India [42]. For a
destructive analysis, the presence of scientists from both sides becomes all the more important because
cooperation will result in confidence in the nuclear forensics process. The nuclear forensic analysis
should be carried out as soon as possible, as it would prevent further pilferage from the source of the
interdicted material.
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E.

Development of Radiation Detection Equipment

India has indigenously developed radiation detection equipment, which includes personal radiation
detectors, aerial radiation detectors, and environmental sampling equipment [43]. It plans to deploy
radiation portal monitors at all of its airports, seaports and manned border crossings by the end of 2015
[44]. Pakistan, too, has a national detection architecture that covers several entry and exit points to detect
and deter illicit trafficking.
Pakistan and India have closely cooperated in multilateral forums like IAEA, in the field of nuclear safety
[45]. They must also cooperate bilaterally by sharing their expertise and learning from each other’s
experiences. BARC and the Electronic Corporation of India Limited (ECIL) of India, a subsidiary of the
Department of Energy, have been at the forefront of research and development in radiation detection and
environmental sampling.
PNRA has also built the School of Nuclear and Radiation Safety, which is equipped with a nondestructive lab and a radiation-testing lab [46]. Scientists from the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science
and Technology (PINSTECH), the major research institute of PAEC, could learn from the research
conducted by BARC and ECIL. Joint radiological safety training can be arranged, which will help both
nations improve their ability to develop nuclear and radiological detection equipment and expertise.

F.

Legal Issues pertaining to Nuclear Forensics

The member states of the United Nations are bound by United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1540 to give nuclear security paramount importance. The resolution recognizes the grave
concerns about the risk of non-state actors trying to acquire, develop, and traffic nuclear, chemical,
biological, and radiological material to employ them in terrorist activities [47]. Furthermore, it shows
concern that the illicit trafficking of such weapons and materials poses a threat to international peace and
security [47]. It also binds states to adopt legislation to prevent trafficking of nuclear and radiological
material [47]. Nuclear forensics is part of nuclear security and cannot be compartmentalized. Therefore,
an effective nuclear security framework requires stringent border controls, physical protection systems,
export controls, and, most importantly, prosecution in the court of law for those who violate all such
arrangements.
India and Pakistan can assemble a sub-committee of reputed jurists and legal experts within the nuclear
forensics-working group to discuss the legal process for nuclear forensics findings. The legal experts can
come up with suggestions for both of the legislative bodies of these countries to formulate laws that create
organizations to prevent illicit trafficking. The countries can draw inspiration from the United States
Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act that was passed in 2010, which established the National Technical
Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC) within the Department of Homeland Security's Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO) [48]. This act also exhorted the President of the United States to pursue
bilateral and multilateral forums that aid in interdicting nuclear and radiological weapons and material,
and investigating post-detonation scenarios involving such weapons and material [49]. Pakistan and India
should also pass legislative acts that help in tackling the threat of nuclear terrorism.
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IV. Impact of a South Asian Nuclear Detection
Architecture
A.

Responsible Nuclear Weapons States

Since their nuclear tests in 1998, both India and Pakistan have been in a quest to be considered as de jure
Nuclear Weapons States. India, with the help of a nuclear deal with the United States, is already
considered a de facto Nuclear Weapons State, but it aims to be accepted into the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) as the sixth nuclear weapon state [50]. On the other hand, Pakistan, aspiring to be treated equal to
India, craves to be recognized as a responsible Nuclear Weapons State [2]. The South Asian Nuclear
Detection Architecture will make India's and Pakistan's case stronger. Furthermore, Pakistan could
advocate for a nuclear deal with the United States based on its nuclear security architecture.

B.

Reduction in Risk of War

There is risk of a war between the two archrivals if non-state actors from Pakistan carry out terrorist
attacks in India. Former United States ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, believes that Prime
Minister Narendra Modi would not show restraint if a terrorist strike in India is linked to Pakistan [51].
In such a scenario, initiatives like the Nuclear Detection Architecture can lessen the chances of war,
particularly in the case of nuclear and radiological terrorism. The international community would also be
supportive of such mechanisms since they reduce the chances of conflict between the nuclear-armed
neighbors.

C.

Confidence Building Measure Between the Archrivals

Active cooperation between Pakistan and India in the nuclear arena will give an impetus to the composite
peace dialogue. It will be a signal to the hawks in both countries that, given the will, Pakistan and India
can solve contentious issues like Kashmir, terrorism, and other territorial conflicts.

V.

Conclusion

Pakistan and India have fought three wars but, as both countries are nuclear-armed, the risk of a future
war needs to be minimized. In the past, non-state actors have brought both nations to the brink of war, be
it the attack on parliament in December 2001 or the Mumbai 2008 attack. There is a fear that any limited
conflict can lead to a “Nuclear Armageddon” in South Asia. Efforts should be made to increase the
escalation ladder in the region, which has been shortened due to Pakistan’s induction of tactical nuclear
weapons. Pakistan has developed tactical nukes in response to India’s threat of a conventional attack in
case there is a terrorist attack linked to non-state actors based in Pakistan. The South Asian Nuclear
Detection Architecture will aid in increasing the escalation ladder, as it will provide a platform for both
nations to trace the perpetrators of any nuclear and radiological attacks in either country.
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